Pipeline in Peril
by Richard A. Fineberg

As it enters its 22nd year of operation, the 800-mile Trans-Alaska Pipeline poses a growing risk to Alaska's inland environment. Carrying more oil than any other pipeline in the US, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS) pumps 1,500,000 barrels of North Slope oil to Port Valdez every day.

The pipeline is operated by the Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., a wholly- owned subsidiary of seven oil companies. ARCO, BP and Exxon own more than 90 percent of Alyeska and control more than 90 percent of North Slope's oil extraction.

TAPS traverses the flat North Slope to enter the Brooks Range, where it climbs from sea level to crest Atigun Pass. From there, the pipeline descends to cross the wide Yukon River. For its final 350 miles, TAPS mounts the Alaska Range, descending and climbing again to 2,788 feet to top Thompson Pass before plunging through Keystone Canyon toward the terminal at Valdez .

The oil, heated to roughly 116 degrees Fahrenheit, is pushed south at 5 mph by ten pump stations powered by powerful jet engines that consume 50,000 gallons of fuel a day. The journey from the North Slope to the 18 giant storage tanks at Valdez takes six days.

Virtually every element of pipeline operations is controlled from the Operations Control Center (OCC) at Valdez. The OCC directs crews at the pipeline's remote pump station who strive to maintain oil flow and regulate pipeline pressure by opening and closing gate valves and moving oil to and from relief tanks.

Picture TAPS as an animal with ten distant hearts - the mainline pumping stations. The brain of this animal is a computer called an MV 20000, which monitors a constant flow of information from the pipeline. This information helps the OCC operators to issue appropriate orders to the pump stations and 62 remote control gate valves (RGVs) along the 800-mile line.

The OCC communicates with pipeline workers, pump stations and RGVs via 42 microwave relay stations that Alyeska calls the Backbone Communications System.

Each pumpstation has a control room operator who manipulates the big mainline pumps, valves, relief tanks and booster and injection pumps. In an emergency, pumpstation personnel can assume direct control of operations.

TAPS crosses 34 rivers and more than 700 smaller streams comprising three major watersheds that drain into two oceans and one sea. Excess oil pressure could rupture the pipe and cause a spill. An inland spill would endanger both the spectacular scenery and the diverse fish and wildlife habitat that is home to moose; caribou; polar, black and grizzly bears; Dall sheep; wolves, wolverines, foxes, lynxes, ptarmigans, grouse, waterfowl and peregrine falcons. Fish at risk from an inland spill include shellfish, grayling, Arctic char, pike, whitefish, lake trout and four species of salmon.

Under normal conditions, Alyeska's Operations Control Center (OCC) at Valdez directs crews at the pipeline's remote pump station who strive to maintain oil flow and regulate pipeline pressure by opening and closing gate valves and moving oil to and from relief tanks. Pump crews also start and stop pumps and inspect the line and report conditions to OCC headquarters.

To stop a spill in progress or to make preventive repairs, Alyeska's only option is to shut down the line.

When Gate Valves Fail
TAPS oil flow is controlled by 151 valves strategically located along the line including: 62 remote control gate valves (RGVs) located immediately upstream of major river crossings and other environmentally sensitive areas, 80 check valves hinged clappers that close automatically in response to back pressure, preventing back flow on uphill slopes when the line is not forcing oil toward Valdez. There are also nine manually operated gate valves used for maintenance.

The RGVs use giant paddle-shaped steel slabs that straddle the pipeline to stop the flow of oil. In open position, a 48-inch-diameter hole in the slab allows oil to continue south. The solid portion of the slab rests above the pipe. On command, a gear forces the giant steel slab down, cutting off pipeline's flow.

The RGVs were originally designed to close in four minutes, limiting drainage after closure to an average of 13,000 barrels, with a maximum spill of 50,000 barrels. The RGVs also permit "staged shutdowns" that prevent over- pressuring of the pipe due to emergency closure.

In order to respond to leaks on the pipeline, it is first necessary to detect them. In 1991, GAO observed that pipeline monitors had never tested the leak detection system to ensure that it worked. In late 1995, the leak detection system approached the accuracy Alyeska promised in 1971 - but only during periods when the pipeline was stable enough to permit accurate calibration of the various inputs required for accurate measurement. In 1995, those conditions occurred for a total of approximately one day out of 30.

When dealing with such huge quantities of oil, relatively small leaks can be serious. A spill of just 0.001 percent of TAPS' daily flow would cover an entire football field with a layer of crude oil more than two inches deep.

Alyeska's 1977 boast that "no spill is likely to flow unnoticed for more than a few minutes" was discredited two years later by the Atigun Pass spill, estimated at between 1,500 and 5,000 barrels. That spill continued for two to four days without triggering an alarm at Valdez.

In 1991, a new, more powerful computer was installed but testing revealed that the system could not detect an 800 barrel per day (bpd) leak: It took six hours to identify a 3,500 bpd leak. During a three-month review in 1993-94, the leak detection system issued false alarms on the average of eight times a month.In November 1995, the system was set to alarm only for spills larger than 3,000 bpd 42 percent of the time.

Alyeska Closes Pump Stations
As shutdowns cause Alyeska and its parent companies to lose money, their increased frequency serves as a warning flag that something is seriously amiss. For TAPS' first 18 years, Alyeska listed only 60 shutdowns. In 1994 (after congressional criticism called public attention to a variety of mechanical problems), Alyeska instituted a new policy requiring a shutdown whenever the OCC loses touch with critical line equipment for more than two minutes.

In 1994 and 1995, the shutdown rate exceeded eight per year. Increased communication failures and corresponding shutdowns may indicate the risks associated with operating an aging pipeline.

In January 1997, Alyeska announced plans to move its field operations headquarters from Anchorage to Fairbanks and Valdez, a tacit recognition that the existing organization lacked effective control of the pipeline.

Alyeska's consistent efforts to cut costs and personnel is an additional factor in pipeline safety. Alyeska is in the process of reducing its base operating costs (exclusive of "fix-up" expenses) from $581 million in 1994 to $409 million in 1999. Large cuts are being made to both the Alyeska work force and the work force of its contractors. Alyeska reduced its staff from 1,352 people in October 1994 to 1,053 by the end of 1995, with a target of 839 employees in 1999.

These cuts are particularly disturbing in view of the audit observation that it was often the expertise and dedication of veteran Alyeska employees that saved the poorly maintained pipeline from disaster. A well-known cost advantage of downsizing is to replace senior staff with lower-paid, less experienced personnel. Alyeska officials maintain that they would never jeopardize safety or the environment to save money, but the conflict between these two goals is inevitable.

In the interest of economy, Alyeska decided to close Pump Stations 8 and 10 in the summer of 1996, bringing pump Station 7 back on line. If throughput decline continues, Pump Stations 2 and 6 will be shut down in 1997. Pipeline workers who are not scheduled for lay off say they are concerned about how Alyeska will handle a broad range of problems.

Ramp down plans call for the increased use of Drag Reducing Agency (DRA), an additive inserted into the line to make oil easier to pump. As Alyeska removes pump stations from action, the company will use more DRA to enable remaining pumps to push the oil south. In 1995, approximately 414,000 gallons were injected into the pipeline.

DRA is a hazardous kerosene-based polymer whose chemical composition is a trade secret. In the pipe, DRA tends to coat the probes that measure the oil flow. When DRA is present, the leak detection systems have an even more difficult time interpreting the data they receive. Operators in Valdez describe the effects of DRA as "spooky."

Problems at Pump Station #9
During an April 1994 maintenance shutdown, a key unit at Pump Station 4 that controls remote gate valves (RGVs) failed. When the faulty control unit was replaced, valves still failed to respond because wiring had grown brittle with age.

After a planned, line-wide maintenance shutdown in September 1995, staff at Pump Station # 9 were waiting for OCC's order to resume pumping. It was just past midnight when the station operator told the "rover" (the assistant who checks the equipment at the facility) to expect an order from Valdez to start up one of the big jet turbines that powers the pumps.

A rapid pressure build-up preceding the arrival of the oil flow caused the yard-check (a pressure-driven one-way valve normally closed to prevent back flow) to slam repeatedly, shaking the ground. The rover went out to make sure things were "holding together" from the day's repairs. He found nothing amiss, though the clapper was slamming and shaking the ground so violently that people in Delta Junction thought they were hearing the explosion of artillery shells at a nearby military Fort Greely.

An hour later, moving oil reached the station and the crew started the pumps. During the restart, the booster pump for the suction line - a 10-inch line that transfers oil from the pump station's 55,000-barrel relief tank back into the mainline - was damaged.

Inspectors found that the actuator that drives the booster suction valve - a unit so large that it takes two men to lift it - ripped out of its four-bolt mounting and came to rest against the bolts of an adjacent flange, its housing cracked from the pounding it took from the yard check's slamming.

Fortunately, on that day, nothing else went wrong while the pump and the lines carrying oil in and out of the relief tank were out of commission.

A Near-Disaster at Pump Station 8
What could go wrong was best exemplified during Alyeska's May 6, 1996 shutdown. Problems began when the oil flow from Prudhoe Bay reached Pump Station 8, just south of Fairbanks.

Both seals on a mainline pump failed. With oil leaking at the pump house, the crew moved to isolate the pumphouse from oil flow. The isolation valves failed and oil continued to flow into the pump station. The start-up turned into a near-disaster, with spilled crude and heavy smoke filling the pump building.

Alyeska investigators later determined that the OCC turned on the mainline pump too soon. There wasn't enough pressure to start the pump which overheated and suffered a "catastrophic failure." Oil continued to flow into the overheated pump for 15 minutes.

To bring Pump Station 8 back on line and deal with another leaking valve at Pump Station 4, the northern portion of the line was shut down again.

On the downslope of the Brooks Range, pressure inside the 48-inch pipe can build to dangerous levels. To relieve that pressure, the tank at Pump Station 5 was built with three times the capacity of relief tanks at other stations. But with PS#5's relief tank was out of commission for repairs, Alyeska planned to divert oil to the smaller relief tanks at stations 6, 7 and 8.

There was a flaw in this plan: At that time, PS7 had been out of service for almost a year and PS#8 was still standing down from the morning's near- disaster. Only the smaller tank at PS#6 was available to take the place of PS5's large tank.

In May 1996, Alyeska took the 150,000 barrel pressure relief tanks at Pump Station 5 out of service for maintenance. PS5 was returned to operation without the requisite inspection and flow testing to ensure the new piping could handle a surge of oil from the pipeline.

Inspection and testing were scheduled for August 29, 1996, four weeks after PS5 had returned to service, but the test was canceled when the inspection revealed that a key pipe support and the large bolts that held a critical clamp in place did not meet specification. Engineers reportedly feared that the surge of oil might rip the system apart. The tests were rescheduled for the following month. During the second test, a hydraulic fluid leak in a key valve resulted in the system being placed in service on an "interim" basis - without a complete test.

A History of Spills and Fires
Shutdowns are not the only indicator of potentially serious problems. The range of mishaps that occurred during the operation of TAPS in 1994 and 1995 includes seven fires , a 2,800-gallon propane leak at a remote gate valve, a 7,100-gallon spill of sodium hydroxide. and Freon leaks from buried lines that keep the foundations of northern facilities frozen.

During 1994 and 1995, potentially serious incidents threatening workers, civilians and the environment included: 9 crude oil spills; 14 other spills; 7 fires; 25 shutdowns or slowdowns due to communication failures; 6 incidents that caused flow reductions; 20 leaks in the Vapor Recovery System piping at the Valdez terminal and four other potentially serious incidents.

Electric cables provide power, control and communications for more than a dozen pump stations and key facilities. Hydrocarbon vapors and electrical sparks can combine to cause fires and explosions. An explosion on TAPS could be catastrophic, endangering lives, property and wilderness.

A 1993 BLM audit conducted by Quality Technology Co., an independent auditor, confirmed a wide range of electrical problems. "The greatest hardware threats to the health and safety of the public and environment," the auditor observed, "relate to the electrical systems."

Overloaded cable trays were the most significant problem. Cable trays are open-topped metal baskets or frames that carry wires to equipment, or hook into other wires. At numerous locations, the auditors observed wires spilling out of overloaded cable trays. In many places the cable trays were inadequately mounted or hung, posing a threat that they could come loose, causing cable breakage.

Subsequent inspections found hazards that included improperly mixed wires, poorly grounded equipment, improperly installed and overloaded junction boxes. Electrical problems caused two of the seven fires reported in 1994 and 1995. Apart from fires and explosions, electrical failures can prevent pipeline operators from shutting down the pipeline or diverting oil to relief tanks to minimize spills.

Inspectors identified, 48,110 items as failing Alyeska's electrical code. Some 17,000 of the electrical deficiencies were simple "housekeeping" items - i.e., missing screws on cover plates or loose grounding connections. That left more than 31,000 major electrical problems still to be dealt with.

Near Disaster at Thompson Pass
Fearing that the pipeline was leaking at Thompson Pass, 27 miles from Valdez, Alyeska mobilized for a major spill response in late November of 1996. Vapor bubbles had been building up in the pipeline on steep descent from Thompson Pass causing a section of the pipeline to begin bouncing vigorously.

Alyeska's government watchdogs later said the bubble phenomenon was well- known. How, then, could the shaking have gone unnoticed by the pipeline operators until residents below phoned in to complain that the earthquake-like shocks coming from the pipeline were waking them up at night?

More perplexing is the four-month delay between the first report on July 25 that the Thompson Pass pipeline was bouncing around and Alyeska's energetic response to a potential oil spill in late November. The cannon-like thumping was strongest near major dents in the pipeline. Such dents can significantly weaken the line. Recognizing this weakness, Alyeska had already put at least six reinforcement sleeves over the line in the five-mile stretch between the lower portion of Thompson Pass and Keystone Canyon.

On Nov. 18, Alyeska's engineers reported serious concerns about pipeline strength near the major dents 20 miles out of Valdez. On November 26, Alyeska sent crews up the steep snow-bound slope of Thompson Pass to install soil gas probes near the site of bubble explosions within the pipe. Two days later, when the probe sniffed hydrocarbon fumes, Alyeska initiated its spill response plan.

When it turned out to be a false alarm, there was a headlong rush to praise Alyeska's vigorous spill-response preparations. Alyeska's eventual response did represent improvement over past performance. But if probes been installed back in September, it would not have been necessary to construct a winter road to haul a drill rig onto the steep side of Thompson Pass to investigate a possible leak.

In 1995 Alyeska began installing a more sophisticated small-leak detection system. The new system was supposed to provide near-instantaneous feedback from the line and locate the approximate source of a leak. Unfortunately, a spill often had to be larger than 2,500 barrels per day to trigger the alarm. The new system, like the old one, issues frequent false alarms.

When Gate Valves Fail
Unplanned RGV closures could cause over-pressuring of the line if upstream pumps continue to push oil downstream towards an unintentionally closed valve.

While accidental full closures have been rare, one occurred in 1982 and another in 1992. The latter, caused by a ground fault in an electrical conduit, resulted in a 131-percent over-pressuring of the pipeline in the hills north of Fairbanks.

Of all the RGV's installed in TAPS, perhaps the most critical ones are those on the steep south flank of the Brooks Range. After the oil crests Atigun Pass, the line drops 3,600 feet over the next 100 miles to Pump Station 5. Pressure inside the pipe can build to dangerous levels. Pump Station 5 was built to relieve this pressure by diverting oil to its 150,000 barrel storage tanks - three times the relief capacity at a typical TAPS pump station.

Because an emergency at PS5 could not wait for response from Valdez, a special computer link was installed between Pump Stations 4 and 5 to automatically shut down the pumps in Station 4 and close remote valves if Station 5 shuts down. But the automatic shut down system only works if the remote computer linkage works. According to TAPS records, 11 of 22 RGV communication problems reported in 1994 and 1995 involved this critical region on the south side of Atigun Pass.

In August 1994, Alyeska disabled all 16 RGVs normally controlled through Pump Station #4 to work on the radio link to the valves. With radio maintenance completed, a two-person crew was assigned to visit each site by helicopter to reactivate the RGV control systems. At RGV #9 ,overlooking the Middle Fork of the Koyukuk River, the maintenance crew restored power without realizing that they had left the manual switch that closes the valve in the "on" position.

With a storm brewing and their helicopter running low on fuel, the workers were in a hurry to complete their mission. They had already headed for the next valve down the line when OCC ordered them back because RGV #39 appeared to be closing.

By the time they landed and re-set the switches, the valve had moved 76 percent of the way toward full closure. Before that week-end was out, the worst storms in memory hit the Brooks Range, closing roads paralleling the pipeline. Any spill response relying on overland transportation would have been seriously crippled.

RGV problems are by no means limited to the critical south slope of the Brooks Range. Another problematic site is Thompson Pass, where the begins a steep descent to Valdez - 27 miles away. One RGV in this critical area registered 86 communication failures in 1994. At various times since 1992, when communications between Valdez and the RGVs has broken down, Alyeska has had to dispatch field staff by truck or helicopter to see whether valves are open or closed. The workers must sit at the valve site with a two-way radio until communications can be re-established.

Government Oversight and the JPO
Alyeska promised to protect the 800-mile corridor and surrounding lands with the safest delivery system possible, but during the pipeline's construction, the discovery of falsified welding certificates brought TAPS into national headlines but after construction was finished, the government's monitoring efforts languished. During the 1980s , a Government Accounting Office report concluded, government monitors simply allowed Alyeska to police itself. Following Alyeska's delayed response to the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, quality control inspector complaints and congressional inquiries led to a revitalizaton of virtually moribund TAPS monitoring efforts.

In 1990, federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Alaska's State Pipeline Coordinator's Office (SPCO) established the Joint Pipeline Office (JPO) - a collaborative effort of 11 state and federal agencies that is responsible for monitoring Alyeska's management of the pipeline.

The cold truth is that regulatory action is subject to the pressures of the political system. With government officials understandably loath to turn off the spigot that controls nearly one-tenth of the country's oil, JPO's main function has been to officially endorse Alyeka's operations - even when agency documents indicate problems with these same operations.

Alaska's State Pipeline Coordinator has admitted that he would be unlikely to shut down TAPS without the direct concurrence of the Alaska Commissioner of Natural Resources and the Alaska Director of the federal Bureau of Land Management. For political and economic reasons, a shutdown of TAPS without the expressed consent of the Governor of Alaska and high-ranking federal officials is highly improbable.

Concerns Remain Unaddressed
Public criticism of the JPO has come primarily from two quarters: The Alaska Forum for Environmental Responsibility (AFER) and Billie Pirner Garde, a whistleblower attorney and AFER counsel. AFER representatives have expressed the following principal concerns about the government monitoring effort:

• Slow identification of significant TAPS problems;
• Lack of stringency when Alyeska misses deadlines or fails to meet goals specified by monitors;
• Slow response to issues raised by whistleblowers and inability to resolve harassment issues;
• JPO's failure to publicly censure Alyeska

JPO deserves credit for re-inventing the TAPS oversight organization to deal with the challenge of ensuring safe oil transport across Alaska. But increased staff, greater funding, new programs and huge volumes of technical paperwork do not, in and of themselves, guarantee effective oversight.

With Alaska's North Slope set to pump oil for decades to come, it becomes increasingly important that TAPS is maintained in top-flight condition. It is difficult to imagine how Alyeska can accomplish this while the company continues to cut operating costs. Yet that's exactly what Alyeska managers are now asking their employees to do.

It is imperative for the President to order an independent task force to evaluate the condition of the pipeline and Alyeska's capability to transport oil across Alaska without causing undue risk to the environment and the nation's oil supply. Congress mandated that review in 1990 but never funded it. In 1996, the JPO said an external review was planned for 1997. To date, it has not materialized.

Without an independent, in-depth review of TAPS operations and government oversight efforts, TAPS will remain a Pipeline in Peril.

Sidebar: Spill Plans: Reconsidered or Just Re-drawn

Sidebar: Sounding TAPS for Competition

Sidebar: Sounding TAPS for the Wild

Richard A. Fineberg has worked as a policy analyst in the Alaska Office of Management and Budget and has served as an advisor to the governor on oil and gas policy. His freelance reporting has appeared in The Nation, The New Republic and the Anchorage Daily News. This report was excerpted from Pipeline in Peril which is available from the Alaska Forum for Environmental Responsibility, PO Box 188, Valdez, AK 99686, (907) 835-5460, fax: (907) 835-5410, www.alaska.net/~afervdz.html